Carl G. Hempel Lecture

"Honorable Mention for the 2010 PROSE Award in Theology & Religious Studies, Association of American Publishers" Mark Johnston is the Walter Cerf Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and the author of Saving God: Religion after Idolatry (Princeton). Why supernatural beliefs are at odds with a true understanding of the afterlife In this extraordinary book, Mark Johnston sets out a new understanding of personal identity and the self, thereby providing a purely naturalistic account of surviving death. Death threatens our sense of the importance of goodness. The threat can be met if there is, as Socrates said, "something in death that is better for the good than for the bad." Yet, as Johnston shows, all existing theological conceptions of the afterlife are either incoherent or at odds with the workings of nature. These supernaturalist pictures of the rewards for goodness also obscure a striking consilience between the philosophical study of the self and an account of goodness common to Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism: the good person is one who has undergone a kind of death of the self and who lives a life transformed by entering imaginatively into the lives of others, anticipating their needs and true interests. As a caretaker of humanity who finds his or her own death comparatively unimportant, the good person can see through death. But this is not all. Johnston's closely argued claims that there is no persisting self and that our identities are in a particular way "Protean" imply that the good survive death. Given the future-directed concern that defines true goodness, the good quite literally live on in the onward rush of humankind. Every time a baby is born a good person acquires a new face. "[P]acked with illuminating philosophical reflection on the question of what we are, and what it is for us to persist over time--on the relations among selves, persons, human beings, bodies and souls."---Thomas Nagel, Times Literary Supplement "[Johnston] reveals himself to be an engaging wit, a swaggering polymath, and . . . a major talent."---Jacques Berlinerblau, Chronicle of Higher Education "Surviving Death and Saving God both provided me with intellectual pleasure of a high order, even though I found many of the author's conclusions false and some morally repugnant. Johnston is the kind of atheist it's good for Christians to read, because he is intelligent, intellectually energetic, and serious about what he engages, and because he shows very clearly just where fastidiousness leads."---Paul J. Griffiths, Commonweal "Mark Johnston's Surviving Death is an immensely interesting book. While it is not without technical discussions of issues in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and personal identity, it is also a very readable book--and one that, despite some modest technicality, lets its author's personality shine through. . . . Surviving Death is a provocative, engaging, and worthwhile book. It is certain to re-invigorate our thinking about the prospects that the good allows in relation to our mortality."---J. Jeremy Wisnewski, Philosophy in Review "[Surviving Death and Saving God] constitute a remarkably thorough and convincing treatment of two extremely important religious issues, those of the perennial allurements of idolatry and the deeply menacing fact of death, to say nothing of the books' endorsement and defense of an arduous but richly inspiring ideal of the religious life. The books are a welcome corrective for some of the most seductive and prevalent distortions of religious thought and practice. I heartily recommend them to the reader who relishes a bountifully laid, religiously nourishing, and deeply satisfying philosophical feast."---Donald A. Crosby, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion "This outstanding book presents original and indeed brave views on a broad range of issues that are of compelling significance not only to philosophers but also to thinking people more

Robert Stalnaker is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Ways a World Might Be, Context and Content, and Inquiry. It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But how should we understand such claims? Standard semantic theories exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a proposition might or must be true if it is true in some or all possible worlds. The actualist, who believes that nothing exists except what actually exists, prefers to talk of possible states of the world, or of ways that a world might be. But even the actualist still faces the problem of explaining what we are talking about when we talk about the domains of other possible worlds. In Mere Possibilities, Robert Stalnaker develops a framework for clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist strategies for solving it. Some philosophers have hypothesized a realm of individual essences that stand as proxies for all merely possible beings. Others have argued that we are committed to the necessary existence of everything that does or might exist. In contrast, Mere Possibilities shows how we can make sense of ordinary beliefs about what might and must exist without making counterintuitive metaphysical commitments. The book also sheds new light on the nature of metaphysical theorizing by exploring the interaction of semantic and metaphysical issues, the connections between different metaphysical issues, and the nature of ontological commitment. "Stalnaker does us a service by illustrating the value--indeed, the philosophical necessity--of working from a conception of the models of possible-world semantic theories that is appropriately extensive, explicit, and nuanced. But prospective readers can also expect a great deal more than that from the serious study that this fine work both requires and repays."---John Divers, Philosophical Quarterly "Mere Possibilities is a rich and subtle text that might be connected in any number of ways to the literature on possible-world semantics and its relationship to metaphysics. . . . Stalnaker does us a service by illustrating the value--indeed, the philosophical necessity--of working from a conception of the models of possible-world semantic theories that is appropriately extensive, explicit, and nuanced. But prospective readers can also expect a great deal more than that from the serious study that this fine work both requires and repays."---John Divers, Oxford Journals "This is a subtle, nuanced exploration of the metaphysical basis for talk of possible worlds and its far from straightforward relation to the version of formal semantics known as 'possible worlds semantics,' both of which have been immensely influential in recent decades. Robert Stalnaker has been one of the major players in debates on these matters, and this book contains significant further developments of his ideas."-Timothy Williamson, University of Oxford "This is a first-rate book and a model of the best kind of unfussy scholarly writing. Robert Stalnaker combines an admirable economy of presentation with clarity, rigor, and thoroughness in exposition and argument. This is a major contribution to the field, and one to which philosophers, logicians, and linguists with any serious interest in modality should attend."-Bob Hale, University of Sheffield

Seana Valentine Shiffrin is professor of philosophy and the Pete Kameron Professor of Law and Social Justice at the University of California, Los Angeles. To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception. Drawing on legal as well as philosophical arguments, the book defends a series of notable claims-that you may not lie about everything to the "murderer at the door," that you have reasons to keep promises offered under duress, that lies are not protected by free speech, that police subvert their mission when they lie to suspects, and that scholars undermine their goals when they lie to research subjects. Many philosophers start to craft moral exceptions to demands for sincerity and fidelity when they confront wrongdoers, the pressures of non-ideal circumstances, or the achievement of morally substantial ends. But Shiffrin consistently resists this sort of exceptionalism, arguing that maintaining a strong basis for trust and reliable communication through practices of sincerity, fidelity, and respecting free speech is an essential aspect of ensuring the conditions for moral progress, including our rehabilitation of and moral reconciliation with wrongdoers. "In her provocative, densely argued and important new book, philosopher Seana Valentine Shiffrin argues that Kant has been misinterpreted. . . . Shiffrin's concern in the punningly titled Speech Matters is to show how telling the truth is fundamental to maintaining the cherished goal of freedom of speech."---Andrew Hadfield, Times Higher Education "Thoughtful and thought provoking." "As compelling defense of sincere communication, Shiffrin's book deserves to be read and contemplated not just by academics interested in the morality of communication, not just by lawyers concerned with the bounds of free speech, but by anyone struggling to define her duties to herself and others in a world awash in lies."---Leslie Kendrick, Harvard Law Review "This very important book will be mandatory reading for legal scholars interested in duress, for philosophers and others concerned with lying, and for legal, philosophical, and political theorists who examine questions of freedom of speech. Shiffrin's arguments for the individual and community importance of sincerity are novel and effective. Her analysis of lying, her philosophical approach to questions of duress, and her connections between a theory of freedom of speech and the idea of freedom of thought all go beyond the existing literature. This is an impressive work."-Frederick Schauer, University of Virginia "This book makes a compelling case for the importance of both veracity and freedom of speech for moral agency and progress. Full of insight and with a distinctive moral tone, this is a very significant contribution from one of the field's most distinguished and original participants."-Liam Murphy, New York University

R. Jay Wallace is the Judy Chandler Webb Distinguished Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. He is the author of Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Normativity and the Will, and The View from Here: On Affirmation, Attachment, and the Limits of Regret. A new way of understanding the essence of moral obligation The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality-namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing. The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms. The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people. "[A] wonderful accomplishment: to have provided us with a highly original and ambitious reinterpretation of the moral domain and to thereby have paved the way for a potential paradigm shift in moral theorizing against the background of the basic idea that "no individual is either more or less important than any other" (p. 20)."---Jonas Vandieken, Journal of Moral Philosophy "[The Moral Nexus] brilliantly explores, with nuance and in detail, the reasons embedded in ordinary moral thought that undergird the appeal of a relational interpretation in moral reasoning. . . . It presents the appeal of a relational interpretation of morality in a way that makes it accessible to those who find its attractions mystifying, while simultaneously forcing those of us already drawn to theorizing about morality in relational terms to carefully consider exactly what we take that to involve.-Paul Kumar, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews" "Wonderfully clear, absorbingly written, and ambitious, The Moral Nexus is an excellent book on a subject of the first importance in moral philosophy. Although it is unlikely that this book will put an end to arguments and debates about relational morality, it takes every aspect of those debates to a new, higher level. It will be a must-read for people working in moral, legal, and political philosophy."-Arthur Ripstein, University of Toronto "The Moral Nexus impressively develops and defends a distinctive view of the essential nature of moral obligation. This ambitious and sophisticated book makes a novel and significant contribution."-Sarah Stroud, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

"A Seminary Co-Op Notable Book of the Year" "Winner of the Easton Award, Foundations of Political Thought section of the American Political Science Association" Tommie Shelby is the Caldwell Titcomb Professor of African and African American Studies and of Philosophy at Harvard University. He is the author of Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent, and Reform and We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity. An incisive and sympathetic examination of the case for ending the practice of imprisonment Despite its omnipresence and long history, imprisonment is a deeply troubling practice. In the United States and elsewhere, prison conditions are inhumane, prisoners are treated without dignity, and sentences are extremely harsh. Mass incarceration and its devastating impact on black communities have been widely condemned as neoslavery or "the new Jim Crow." Can the practice of imprisonment be reformed, or does justice require it to be ended altogether? In The Idea of Prison Abolition, Tommie Shelby examines the abolitionist case against prisons and its formidable challenge to would-be prison reformers. Philosophers have long theorized punishment and its justifications, but they haven't paid enough attention to incarceration or its related problems in societies structured by racial and economic injustice. Taking up this urgent topic, Shelby argues that prisons, once reformed and under the right circumstances, can be legitimate and effective tools of crime control. Yet he draws on insights from black radicals and leading prison abolitionists, especially Angela Davis, to argue that we should dramatically decrease imprisonment and think beyond bars when responding to the problem of crime. While a world without prisons might be utopian, The Idea of Prison Abolition makes the case that we can make meaningful progress toward this ideal by abolishing the structural injustices that too often lead to crime and its harmful consequences. " The time is right for a book like Tommie Shelby's The Idea of Prison Abolition-one that closely and carefully examines, in detail and with rigor, some of the best arguments on behalf of abolishing prisons, and does so with philosophical sophistication, crystal-clear prose, and admirable breadth."---Jennifer Lackey, Journal of Philosophy "A good intellectual case against abolitionism."---Andy West, The Philosopher "'Radical flank' theory was once used to show how hyping the threat of revolutionary Black Power groupings in the 1960s was used by liberals to make the more moderate, but still unsettling, demands of the Civil Rights movement seem more palatable to White America. Shelby is attempting something similar here with abolitionism, using it to galvanise the more moderate American Left into seeing the desperate urgency of ending mass incarceration-while crucially dropping its contentious name. . . . Necessary reading."---Mike Nellis, Punishment & Society "In this sharp and provocative book, Tommie Shelby shines new light on the misguided logics and harmful practices that structure the entire criminal legal system in America. He engages the political philosophy of Angela Davis to advance our understanding of the legacy of slavery, the impact of racism, the morality of punishment, the limits of reform, the meaning of justice, and other important questions that have been central to Davis's work and the growing movement to abolish prisons. No matter where you stand on the issue, The Idea of Prison Abolition is essential reading that will frame debates about the purpose and function of incarceration for decades to come."-Elizabeth Hinton, author of From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America "Should our manifestly unjust prison system be abolished or radically reformed? With characteristic philosophical acumen, and by way of a careful, nuanced engagement with Angela Davis's powerful and influential defense of pris

Stephen Yablo is professor of linguistics and philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of Things: Papers on Objects, Events, and Properties and Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality. Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. But it has played no real role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising; sentences have aboutness-properties if anything does. Aboutness is the first book to examine through a philosophical lens the role of subject matter in meaning. A long-standing tradition sees meaning as truth-conditions, to be specified by listing the scenarios in which a sentence is true. Nothing is said about the principle of selection--about what in a scenario gets it onto the list. Subject matter is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand where its subject matter is concerned. Stephen Yablo maintains that this is not just a feature of subject matter, but its essence. One indicates what a sentence is about by mapping out logical space according to its changing ways of being true or false. The notion of content that results--directed content--is brought to bear on a range of philosophical topics, including ontology, verisimilitude, knowledge, loose talk, assertive content, and philosophical methodology. Written by one of today's leading philosophers, Aboutness represents a major advance in semantics and the philosophy of language. "This is an important and far-reaching book that philosophers will be discussing for a long time. There are doctoral dissertations, articles, and books to write exploring the possibilities and limitations of [Yablo's] approach."---Adam Morton, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "Stephen Yablo's Aboutness is something of a sensation. It instantiates two firsts: it is the first book ever published on aboutness in logic and language, on the question, therefore, what it is for a sentence to be about something, and it is the first book Yablo publishes."---Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, Analysis Reviews "This is an excellent book. Aboutness is highly original and represents a major contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language."-Thomas Hofweber, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill "Aboutness is a major achievement. Yablo is one of the most distinctive philosophical writers of our time. Every sentence of this landmark book is a joy, and the discussion is elegant throughout. In this part of philosophy, it doesn't get better than this."-Gideon Rosen, Princeton University

Scott Soames is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and director of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. He is the author of many books, including The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 1; Analytic Philosophy in America; Philosophy of Language; Philosophical Essays; and Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century (all Princeton). In this book, Scott Soames argues that the revolution in the study of language and mind that has taken place since the late nineteenth century must be rethought. The central insight in the reigning tradition is that propositions are representational. To know the meaning of a sentence or the content of a belief requires knowing which things it represents as being which ways, and therefore knowing what the world must be like if it is to conform to how the sentence or belief represents it. These are truth conditions of the sentence or belief. But meanings and representational contents are not truth conditions, and there is more to propositions than representational content. In addition to imposing conditions the world must satisfy if it is to be true, a proposition may also impose conditions on minds that entertain it. The study of mind and language cannot advance further without a conception of propositions that allows them to have contents of both of these sorts. Soames provides it. He does so by arguing that propositions are repeatable, purely representational cognitive acts or operations that represent the world as being a certain way, while requiring minds that perform them to satisfy certain cognitive conditions. Because they have these two types of content-one facing the world and one facing the mind-pairs of propositions can be representationally identical but cognitively distinct. Using this breakthrough, Soames offers new solutions to several of the most perplexing problems in the philosophy of language and mind. "By incorporating elements of philosophy of mind into language and metaphysics, this book represents an important turn in thinking about propositions. The book is certain to have a significant impact in discussions of logic, language, and mind in 21st-century analytic philosophy." "This book provides an up-to-date and coherent version of Soames' theory of propositions. . . . However, this work is far from being just the result of collecting together the author's previous achievement in this field. On the contrary, it contains an original proposal while also representing years of research in a systematic and persuasive essay."---Edoardo Rivello, MathSciNet "This is a very significant and original contribution to the philosophy of language, centering on a new way of thinking about propositions. Previous authors have treated propositions as abstract entities that speakers and hearers are aware of and that constitute the meanings or contents of sentences. But Soames argues persuasively that propositions are best thought of as things people do. In developing this idea, he shows how his proposal solves significant difficulties in the philosophy of language. This book will make a huge impact on the subject."-Gilbert Harman, Princeton University "This is a brilliant book and it will be extremely influential. It lays out Soames's important theory of propositions, and significantly extends that theory to solve central problems in the foundations of the study of mind and language. Soames has gone further than anyone else in trying to use a theory of the metaphysics of propositions to illuminate issues in the theory of content."-Jeff Speaks, University of Notre Dame