Transforming War

Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day. Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force's internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC's mission. In order to prepare SAC's "warriors" to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world's most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its "culture" until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.

Rise of the Mavericks traces the beginnings and subsequent development of the U.S. Air Force Security Service. Established in 1948 as part of the emerging U.S. national security apparatus, this communications intelligence organization was meant to place the fledgling U.S. Air Force on a competitive footing with its Army and Navy counterparts.  As World War II ended and the Cold War began, Air Force leaders understood that an effective cryptologic capability would be crucial for maintaining and enhancing the Air Force as a strategic and decisive component of America's national defense. Successfully deploying air-atomic strategy in the event of a future war would require reliable information on the capabilities, intentions-and potential targets-of an opposing force, in particular the Soviet Union. Communications intelligence would be a critical source of this information, and Air Force leaders were adamant that their service not remain dependent on other service structures for this capability. The Air Force Security Service rose to the occasion, quickly establishing itself as one of the preeminent communications intelligence agencies in the United States. Rise of the Mavericks fills the gap in the military and intelligence history literature and further complicates the literature surrounding the history of the NSA, which too often ignores or hastily addresses the contributions and role of the service COMINT agencies during the early Cold War period. The book explains how Air Force Security Service personnel were viewed as mavericks by other U.S. military and government organizations. The airmen lived up to this characterization by creating and developing an independent communications intelligence capability while persistently resisting the controlling efforts of the Armed Forces Security Agency and the National Security Agency.

From Yeomanettes to Fighter Jets addresses a major element of twenty-first century sea power-the integration of women into all military units of the U.S. Navy. Randy Goguen delineates the cultural, economic, and political conditions as well as the technological changes that shaped this movement over the course of a century. Starting with the establishment of the Yeomen (F) in World War I and continuing through today to address the current arguments over the registration of women for Selective Service and the reform of the military justice system, Goguen describes how changes in civilian society affected the U. S. Navy and the role of Navy women. She highlights the contributions of key women and men in the military and civilian spheres who were willing to challenge convention and prejudice to advance the integration of women and make the U.S. Navy a stronger institution.  Today women in the U.S. Navy have proven themselves essential to the mission success of the service. They are forward deployed around the world, sharing the same risks as their male counterparts. Some have commanded logistics and combatant ships, including aircraft carriers. They fly and maintain combat and patrol aircraft and serve as crew members on ships and submarines. Some hold major commands ashore and have risen to the highest echelons of navy leadership.    Integrating women into the U.S. Navy has been a long and often contentious process, as women strived to overcome resistance imposed by prevailing cultural and institutional norms and patriarchal prejudices. Goguen, a retired naval reserve officer who holds a PhD in military history from Temple University, has written a comprehensive and up-to-date history of women's integration into the Navy. She argues that throughout the process, the decisive force driving progress was exigency. That exigency took various forms: two world wars, communist expansionism in the Cold War, the ending of the draft and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, as well as the political pressures posed by social change, especially the mid twentieth-century feminist and contemporary "Me Too" movements. Despite a deeply ingrained institutional resistance cultivated within an insular, often misogynist, sea-going subculture, today's U.S. Navy could not meet its mission requirements without women. Goguen asserts, "Exigency is the mother of integration."

Although the United States won the race to the moon, the Soviets were far more active in space than Americans during the decade that followed. By the 1980s, some space experts feared the United States was in danger of being surpassed in space, including dual-use systems that might be employed offensively in a military confrontation. A few experts, looking ahead, recommended a space force within roughly two decades. Standing up Space Force is organized chronologically by presidential administration, beginning in the middle of the Clinton years and progressing through the Trump administration. During the Clinton and George W. Bush years, the move to national security space was incremental. The Obama presidency witnessed the rise of NewSpace entrepreneurs whose impressive space activities facilitated their initial partnering with U.S. government National Security Space (NSS) missions helping the United States keep pace with China and Russia. During the Trump administration, all necessary elements finally came together – most significantly, presidential-congressional leadership and bipartisan support – to eventually produce the fiscal 2020 national defense authorization act (NDAA). Because the NDAA authorized and provided for the Space Force, when the President signed the defense bill on 20 December 2019, at the same moment he officially established the nation's sixth armed service.

One of the most difficult security challenges of the post–Cold War era has been stabilizing failing states in an era of irregular warfare. A consistent component of the strategy to address this problem has been security force assistance where outside powers train and advise the host nation's military. Despite billions of dollars spent, the commitment of thousands of advisors, and innumerable casualties, the American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq failed catastrophically. Nevertheless, among those colossal military disasters were pockets of success. The Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) held back the Islamic State in 2014 long enough to allow American and allied forces to flow back into the country, and many Afghan commando units fought to the bitter end as their country disintegrated around them. What made those units successful while the larger missions ended disastrously? Author Frank K. Sobchak explores security force assistance across five case studies, examining what factors were most critical for U.S. Special Forces units to build capable partners like the ISOF and the commandos. More specifically, the book assesses the impact of five components of Special Forces advisory missions: language training and cultural awareness of the advising force; the partner force-to-advisor ratio; the advisors' ability to organize host-nation forces; whether advisors are permitted to guide in combat; and the consistency in advisor pairing. Based on the experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces in El Salvador (1981–1991), Colombia (2002–2016), the Philippines (2001–2015), Iraq (2003–2011), and Afghanistan (2007–2021), Sobchak argues that the most crucial factors in producing combat-effective partners are consistency in advisor pairing and maintaining a partner force-to-advisor ratio of twelve special forces soldiers advising a company-sized force or smaller. Intriguingly, and counter to conventional wisdom, at first glance language training and cultural awareness do not seem to be critical factors, as most of the Green Berets that trained units in Iraq and Afghanistan lacked both capabilities. Despite an orthodoxy that argues the opposite, there is little evidence that combat advising is decisive in producing effective partners and there is conflicting evidence that language training and cultural awareness are important. Many of these findings, while focused on Special Forces operations and doctrine, could be used to improve the odds of success for larger security-force assistance missions as well.

It is convenient to think that bad guys are drumming up money for their activities far away and in shady back alleys, but the violent non-state actors (VNSAs) of the world are hiding in plain sight. They peddle knockoff sneakers, pass the hat at ethnic festivals, take a cut of untaxed booze sales, swindle senior citizens with bogus phone calls about needing bail in Mexico, and run money through mainstream banks to buy up rental properties (just to name a few). On a grand scale, their behavior erodes rule of law, creates moral injuries from corruption, and emboldens bad actors to steal and back violent tactics with impunity.  Blood Money analyzes the ways in which VNSAs find money for their operations and sustainment, from controlling a valuable commodity to harnessing the grievances of a networked diaspora, and it looks at the channels through which they can flip the positives of globalization into flat, fast, and frictionless movement of people, funds, and materials needed to terrorize and coerce their opponents. Author Margaret Sankey highlights the mundane and everyday nature of these tactics, occurring under our noses online, in legitimate marketplaces, and with the aegis of intelligence services and national governments.   While reforms attempt to curtail these options, their utility and efficacy as tools of finance have proved inadequate for sovereign states.  VNSAs' defiance of rules and their capable adaptation and innovation make them extremely difficult to pin down or prosecute. Many security publications stress legislation and enforcement or frame illicit finance as a military or police problem. With Blood Money, Sankey points out the many ways VNSAs evade law enforcement, and she offers options for involving consumers and activists in exercising agency and choices in how they apply their money and where it goes. Blood Money also provides context for whole-of-government approaches to attacking underlying supports for illicit financing channels. How these groups finance themselves is key to understanding how they function and what actions might be taken to derail their plans or dismantle their structure.

Sean Maloney reveals how Vladimir Putin has aggressively leveraged nuclear signaling to manipulate NATO and deter Western intervention in Ukraine. With Cold War–level brinkmanship and modern information warfare, Russia's tactics have reshaped the strategic landscape-and raised urgent questions about how long the West can hold the line. Nuclear signaling is defined as the deliberate maneuvering of nuclear forces to deter and influence an adversary's actions. Author Sean Maloney shows how Russian leader Vladimir Putin has systematically employed nuclear signaling to force desired behavior from both NATO and the United States. This strategy has escalated greatly during the Russo-Ukraine War as Putin seeks to deter Western intervention and support of Ukraine. Putin uses many forms of nuclear signaling, including ordering jets capable of carrying nuclear weapons to fly in western European airspace, staging a joint bomber exercise with China near Alaska, and instructing submarines carrying nuclear weapons to surface through the Arctic icepack. The frequency of this signaling far exceeds that of similar activity during the Cold War and has escalated to more dangerous levels than before. When Russia experienced setbacks on the battlefield, Putin often intensified his nuclear-force posturing by paring it with thinly veiled threats to use tactical nuclear weapons. Maloney argues convincingly that in the post–Cold War era, Putin has skillfully combined his use of nuclear signaling with advances in information technology to more effectively manipulate Western nations. He asserts that the United States was initially late in recognizing this development, but as the situation worsened, America and NATO have devised a series of responses that now hold Russia in check. The question is, for how long? Maloney concludes that Putin's nuclear posturing has produced mixed results. First and foremost, Putin did successfully deter the United States and other NATO countries from outright military action in defense of Ukraine following the 2022 invasion. However, Russia's nuclear signaling did not prevent the West from providing weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, nor did it stop NATO's expansion. Nevertheless, the partial success of Russia's Cool War activity does not lessen the significance of this new reality or the scope of the problems that face the West moving forward.

Featuring biographical chapters on the leaders who served in space roles in the U.S. Air Force, Army, or Marine Corps, including officers who experienced the celestial skies firsthand as astronauts, Space Force Pioneers aims to enhance the reader's understanding of character and leadership in military space from the experiences of these elite, ground-breaking leaders. The opening chapter explains in detail how the United States Space Force evolved from the Air Force. It is followed by ten biographical chapters that examine the stellar careers of space pioneers and illuminate their varied leadership styles. The chapter authors, all experts on the subject matter, engagingly capture the essence of these impressive individuals by incorporating information derived from the personal papers of their subjects and-in some cases-oral histories and interviews, along with other historical sources. They make clear the lasting contributions each of these leaders made to military space while serving in or out of uniform. Space Force Pioneers offers insight and analysis into how these unique leaders have operated in the performance of their duties, as well as chronicling changes in military space over the past four decades. The volume concludes with a broad and probing interpretation of contemporary space leadership, which offers a vehicle for comparing the accomplishments of these distinctive military space leaders.

As Clausewitz observed, "In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect." The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit's skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case, the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.

For more than half of its existence, members of the Marine Corps largely self-identified as soldiers. It did not yet mean something distinct to be a Marine, either to themselves or to the public at large. As neither a land-based organization like the Army nor an entirely sea-based one like the Navy, the Corps' missions overlapped with both institutions. This work argues that the Marine Corps could not and would not settle on a mission, and therefore it turned to an image to ensure its institutional survival. The process by which a maligned group of nineteenth-century naval policemen began to consider themselves to be elite warriors benefited from the active engagement of Marine officers with the Corps' historical record as justification for its very being. Rather than look forward and actively seek out a mission that could secure their existence, late nineteenth-century Marines looked backward and embraced the past. They began to justify their existence by invoking their institutional traditions, their many martial engagements, and their claim to be the nation's oldest and proudest military institution. This led them to celebrate themselves as superior to soldiers and sailors. Although there are countless works on this hallowed fighting force, How the Few Became the Proud is the first to explore how the Marine Corps crafted such powerful myths.

The United States has the most expensive and seemingly military forces in the world. Yet, since World War II its military success rate has been fairly meager. The Korean War was a draw, Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include: Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. The vital interests of the United States are seldom at stake; instead, the US intervenes to punish aggressors or topple particularly inhumane dictators. As a result, the US and its allies strive to maintain public support, both at home and abroad. One of the surest ways to lose this support is to suffer high casualties or, worse, inflict them on the societies we are ostensibly attempting to help. The goal of limiting cost and casualties is hindered by the introduction of large numbers of conventional ground troops-especially in the xenophobic societies of the Middle East. This desire to limit risk and cost, while still achieving definable political goals, results in a quandary. This is not a new problem, and as early as two millennia ago nations sought to achieve these dual and often contradictory goals against enemies with asymmetric strengths. Often, nations rejected taking on a powerful enemy head-to-head; instead, belligerents launched "second front operations"-they moved the war elsewhere to achieve local superiority. Not surprisingly, this strategy was especially appealing to nations possessing powerful navies. Britain, who controlled the seas for several centuries, was especially adept at using this "second front" strategy. Today we find that although second fronts may not be necessary, the reasons for conducting such operations are still with us-the desire to limit risk while achieving measurable goals. For America that means eschewing the use of massive numbers of ground troops to invade and occupy a subject country, but instead using its asymmetric strengths-a combination of airpower, SOF, intelligence and indigenous ground troops to achieve political goals.