Africa@War

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its military strategy and political pacification program on this singular advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC rebels, which was fighting for the colony's independence from European rule. The air war for Guinea stands as a remarkable episode in air power history for several reasons. It was, for example, the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organized air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralization doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. Ultimately, the FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded, in turn, its own operational initiative; the battlefield effectiveness of increasingly air-dependent ground forces; Portuguese military morale and national resilience; and ultimately, Lisbon's tenability as an imperial power. The air war for Portuguese Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of overreliance on air supremacy. This, the second of three volumes in the Sanctuary Lost mini-series, examines the evolution of Portuguese air power and guerrilla air defenses during the conflict's most active years, as both sides sought the means and methods required to counter the other's efforts to control Guinea's airspace. It is richly illustrated throughout with original photographs and includes specially commissioned color artworks.

Koevoet (Afrikaans for 'Crowbar') tells of the origination and deployment of the South West African Police's elite counter-insurgency capability during the South African Border War of 1978–1989. Drawing upon previously unpublished sources and from interviews with a number of key personalities, including former members of Koevoet, this volume, the first of two, documents the formation of Koevoet and its early operations up to 1984. Koevoet examines the background and context to the South West African conflict and details the early experiences of the South African Police in seeking to counter SWAPO/PLAN activities. It outlines the tasking assigned to Colonel Hans Dreyer of the South African Police to establish 'Ops K' and to develop a counter-insurgency unit as part of the South West African Police response to the developing conflict; a unit that was to become both respected and feared and is, today, considered as one of the most effective counter-insurgency forces of modern times. Koeveot describes the recruitment of trackers from the local population; the integration of black and white Koevoet operators into a single entity; their training, organization and deployment across the 'Operational Area'. The author examines Koevoet tactics in the field – including all arms co-operation with the South African Defence Force and the South African Air Force and the practice of 'turning' captured SWAPO/PLAN fighters and their employment across the Zulu teams. The design and evolution of the iconic Casspir and Wolf Mine-Protected Vehicles (MPVs) is covered as is their practical use on operations, alongside the development of other specialized weapons and equipment utilized by Koevoet. In documenting Koevoet operations in Kavnago, Kaokoland and Owamboland, Volume 1 of Koevoet seeks to examine SWAPOL-COIN's effectiveness and to assess how the lessons learned between 1979–1984, shaped future Koevoet doctrine and thinking, to afford the reader a truly inclusive perspective on counter-insurgency today as police and armed forces globally move to a greater reliance on cutting-edge digital technology, including artificial intelligence. Color profiles detail a range Mine-Protected Vehicles (MPVs) used by Koevoet, including the iconic Casspir and Wolf, along with SADF and SAAF helicopters used to support these operations. Uniforms and insignia of Koevoet are presented in specially commissioned full color artworks.

Though the dynamics of the Congo Crisis have received, and continue to receive, a good deal of literary and scholarly attention, missing from the canon of work on military forces in the Congo is a study of the Force Publique, a paramilitary police force established by King Léopold II to secure the Congo Free State and to protect a vast geographical swath of Central Africa that had become his own personal possession following the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. In many ways, the absence of any study on the origins of the Force Publique to its dissolution in 1960 means that our knowledge surrounding the history of the Belgian Congo and the modern-day Democratic Republic of the Congo is incomplete. Indeed, it is possible to trace the origins of rebellion in the Congo Crisis (1960–1967) back to the Batetela Rebellions that took place in the Congo Free State in the 1890s and early 1900s, and to link them with a succession of anti-Belgian popular uprisings that took place in the Congo up to the time of the Congo's independence. Moreover, a revolt by NCOs of the Force Publique was one of the sparks that plunged the Congo into crisis in early July 1960. It would be wrong to say, nonetheless, that the geographical extent of this volume – the first of two on Belgian military forces in the Congo – is limited within the boundaries of the Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo: through descriptions of military encounters in Africa in the late 1890s and First and Second World Wars, the history of the Force Publique is extended into a study of war in the Sudan, East Africa, and in Ethiopia. For aviation enthusiasts, this volume is significant in that its objective is to provide a history of the development of air travel to and from the Belgian Congo in addition to examining the evolution of military air forces in the colony. Again, we can link the Force Publique's air branch to the Congo Crisis as a number of its pilots and aircraft served to form the basis of the Katangan Air Force and the Congolese Air Force; two forces that were highly influential in deciding the future of the Congo after its independence. The first volume of Belgian Military Forces in the Congo is illustrated throughout with photographs and includes specially commissioned color artworks of the weapons, soldiers and aircraft of the Force Publique.

In 1975 Spain relinquished control of its former colony of Spanish Sahara following a short conflict with the Polisario, the armed movement representing many of the native Sahrawi people. In the wake of Spain's withdrawal, neighboring Morocco and Mauritania divided and occupied the territory. In a fierce guerrilla war that saw the Polisario raid deep into Mauritania and even directly attack the capital city, the latter nation gave up any claim to Western Sahara in 1979 and withdrew. Morocco, however, chose to continue their occupation, building a massive berm stretching for hundreds of kilometers in an effort to contain the Polisario, and fighting continued until a ceasefire was agreed in 1991. One key element of the 1991 agreement was that a UN supervised referendum would be conducted to determine the future of Western Sahara. To that end MINURSO (Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental) was created to oversee the ceasefire and organize the referendum. Over 30 years later, however, that referendum has still not taken place despite the original agreement and the involvement of some of the late twentieth century's leading diplomats, and contrary to its previous promises, Morocco is only willing to grant a "high degree of autonomy" in the occupied Western Sahara. The Sahrawis and Polisario refuse to accept this, thus the conflict remains unresolved and ever on the brink of reigniting. The author of the book, János Besenyő, a professor at Óbuda University in Budapest, Hungary, and who served as a peacekeeper in MINURSO, presents the history of the area, the path leading to the creation of the mission, and its operation over the past three decades, and provides a detailed description of the mission's team sites and the opposing forces of the Polisario and Morocco. This book draws upon several previously unpublished documents as well as previously unpublished photographs taken by peacekeepers. This book is recommended not only to military, foreign policy and diplomatic experts, but also to anyone interested in the history of the region, the events there, and the oldest peacekeeping operation in Africa.

The Rif War in rugged northern Morocco is remembered for romantic films and novels about the French Foreign Legion, such as Beau Geste. In reality, the French intervention, although very important, was late and secondary in importance to that of the Spanish. The second volume of The Rif War begins with the aftermath of the Disaster of Annual and documents the Spanish response and reconquest of Morocco. While the renewed campaign remained largely one of columns, outposts and fortresses, it also took on the character of a very modern war, with the use of armored vehicles, trench warfare, aircraft, chemical weapons and large-scale amphibious landings by combined arms forces. Indeed, the Spanish landing at Alhucemas, conducted with French naval support, would become the subject of study by the Allies in the Second World War. Yet despite these innovations, including a number of 'firsts' in the history of conflict and in particular, of the history of conflict in Africa, Spain would continue to suffer heavy casualties in a bitterly fought contest for control of Morocco. Volume 2 of The Rif War covers the Spanish reconquest of the positions lost after the Disaster of Annual in the Melilla Sector, the near disaster of Xauen in the Western zone of the African Protectorate, the Rifian attack in French Morocco, the Landing at Alhucemas and the Spanish-French offensive, with the capture of Abd El-Krim and the destruction of his forces, and the final campaigns in the Gomara region to pacify the Protectorate. This series of books addresses the organization of the Spanish and Rifian armies, and of the air forces and their operations, including those of an incipient and frustrated Rifian aviation. The war also saw the Spanish Army completely reformed, reaching new levels of effectiveness with the Spanish Legion and the recruitment of Moroccan soldiers of the Regulares. This volume is richly illustrated with original photographs of the conflict, and includes specially commissioned artworks showing the men, vehicles, aircraft and ships employed in the Rif War.

This book provides a history of the roots of FNLC (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo: ex-Katanga Gendarmerie) in Angola and Zaire, political situation under Mobutu regime, FNLC incursions into Zaire border since 1977 ("Shaba Wars I and II") and subsequent hostage taking in mining town of Kolwezi. The author describes the subsequent French Foreign Legion and Belgian Para Commando airborne operation and freeing of the hostages, together with practical destruction of the FNLC as fighting force.

From 1963 to 1974, Portugal and its nationalist enemies fought an increasingly intense war for the independence of "Portuguese" Guinea, then a colony but now the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. For most of the conflict, Portugal enjoyed virtually unchallenged air supremacy, and increasingly based its strategy on this advantage. The Portuguese Air Force (Força Aérea Portuguesa, abbreviated FAP) consequently played a crucial role in the Guinean war. Indeed, throughout the conflict, the FAP – despite the many challenges it faced – proved to be the most effective and responsive military argument against the PAIGC, which was fighting for Guinea's independence. The air war for Guinea is unique for historians and analysts for several reasons. It was the first conflict in which a non-state irregular force deployed defensive missiles against an organized air force. Moreover, the degree to which Portugal relied on its air power was such that its effective neutralization doomed Lisbon's military strategy in the province. The FAP's unexpected combat losses initiated a cascade of effects that degraded in turn its own operational freedom and the effectiveness of the increasingly air-dependent surface forces, which felt that the war against the PAIGC was lost. The air war for Guinea thus represents a compelling illustration of the value – and vulnerabilities – of air power in a counter-insurgency context, as well as the negative impacts of over reliance on air supremacy. Volume 1 of Sanctuary Lost is extensively illustrated with photographs and specially commissioned color artworks.

The Rif War in rugged northern Morocco is remembered for romantic films and novels about the French Foreign Legion, such as Beau Geste. In reality, the French intervention, although very important, was late and secondary in importance to that of the Spanish.  Spain, had been fighting in North Africa since 1909 in order to carve out new colonial possessions, in part at least to compensate for the recent loss of Cuba and the Philippines to the U.S. It was not an easy road however and Spain suffered disasters such as Barranco del Lobo and victories such as the cavalry charge in Taxdirt in 1913, and had had to face enemies such as Mizzian, El Roghi, or the famous El Raisuni. Abd-el Krim's revolt caused 8,000 Spanish deaths at Annual in 1921 in which much of the new colony was lost, at least temporarily. The war also saw the Spanish army completely reformed, reaching new levels of effectiveness with the founding of the Spanish Legion and the recruitment of Moroccan soldiers of the Regulares. These troops, together with a plethora of commanders who made their combat debuts here, such as Franco, Mola, Queipo de Llano and Kindelán, would later fight in the Spanish Civil War. These commanders would be called the "Africanistas" and would constitute the hard core of the military that rose up against the government in 1936. Volume 1 of The Rif War examines the operations of both sides in North Africa between 1909 and 1921, up to the Disaster of Annual. Within are details of the Spanish army, its organization, tactics and reforms to meet the needs of the theater, the fledgling Spanish military aviation which claimed a number of world firsts in this campaign, and their North African auxiliaries and opponents. The Rif War is illustrated with a selection of color artworks and specially commissioned maps.

Lacking funding to purchase and operate own aircraft, the Rhodesian police established the British South Africa Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW). Equipped with private aircraft, mostly flown by owner pilots, this extended policing across a country that had few roads, reaching remote villages and farms, separated by long distances. Established in 1967, the PRAW assisted in the capture of criminals, transported police officers, and flew in support of police operations. During the 1960s, it was expanded into three flights with more than 20 aircraft. By 1974, the PRAW included five flights, by 1979, nine, with two of its pilots being awarded the M.B.E. for outstanding services. As the conflict in Rhodesia escalated, it began actively cooperating with the Rhodesian armed forces: its miscellany of Beechs, Cessnas, Pipers, and Taylorcraft – all apparently 'sports and utility' aircraft - were armed: sometimes with light machine guns installed in underwing pods, but often with heavy machine guns that fired through the side doors, de-facto converting them into mini-gunships. Based on extensive use of official documentation, participant recollections, and richly illustrated, Copper Wings: British South Africa Police Reserve Force Air Wing Volume 2 continues an account of this service.

Lacking funding to purchase and operate own aircraft, the Rhodesian police established the British South Africa Police Reserve Air Wing (PRAW). Equipped with private aircraft, mostly flown by owner pilots, this extended policing across a country that had few roads, reaching remote villages and farms, separated by long distances. Established in 1967, the PRAW assisted in the capture of criminals, transported police officers, and flew in support of police operations. During the 1960s, it was expanded into three flights with more than 20 aircraft: all of these saw gradually intensifying operations as the war in Rhodesia escalated. Based on extensive use of official documentation and participant recollections alike, and richly illustrated, Copper Wings: British South Africa Police Reserve Force Air Wing Volume 1 is the first operational history of the service from its establishment in 1967, until 1974.

A concise, gripping history of the resource-rich yet poverty-wracked nation's instability and military conflict in the 1960s. Includes maps and photos. Post-independence events in the Republic of the Congo are a veritable Gordian knot. The ambitions of Congolese political leaders, Cold War rivalry, Pan-Africanism, Belgium's continued economic interests in the country's mineral wealth, and the strategic perceptions of other southern African states all conspired to wrack Africa's second largest country with uprisings, rebellions, and military interventions for almost a decade. Congo Unravelled solves the intractable complexity of this violent period by dispassionately outlining the sequence of political and military events in the troubled country. It systematically reviews the first military attempts to stabilize Congo after independence, and the two distinguishing campaigns of the decade-the United Nations military operations to end the secession of the Katanga Province, and the Dragon Operations led by Belgian paratroopers, supported by the US Air Force, launched to end the insurgency in the east-are chronicled in detail. Finally, the mercenary revolt-which tainted the reputation of the modern mercenary in Africa-is described. Lesser known military events-Irish UN forces cut off from the outside world by Katangese gendarmes and mercenaries, and a combined operation in which Belgian paratroopers were dropped from US Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and supported by a mercenary ground force to achieve humanitarian ends-go far toward resolving the enigma surrounding post-independence Congo.

The Second World War forever altered the complexion of the British Empire. From Cyprus to Malaya, from Borneo to Suez, the dominoes began to fall within a decade of peace in Europe. Africa in the late 1940s and 1950s was energized by the grant of independence to India, and the emergence of a credible indigenous intellectual and political caste that was poised to inherit control from the waning European imperial powers. The British on the whole managed to disengage from Africa with a minimum of ill feeling and violence, conceding power in the Gold Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone under an orderly constitutional process, and engaging only in the suppression of civil disturbances in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia as the practicalities of a political hand over were negotiated. In Kenya, however, matters were different. A vociferous local settler lobby had accrued significant economic and political authority under a local legislature, coupled with the fact that much familial pressure could be brought to bear in Whitehall by British settlers of wealth and influence, most of whom were utterly irreconciled to the notion of any kind of political hand over. Mau Mau was less than a liberation movement, but much more than a mere civil disturbance. Its historic importance is based primarily on the fact that the Mau Mau campaign was one of the first violent confrontations in sub-Saharan Africa to take place over the question of the self-determination of the masses. It also epitomized the quandary suffered by the white settler communities of Africa who had been promised utopia in an earlier century, only to be confronted in a postwar world by the completely unexpected reality of black political aspiration. This book journeys through the birth of British East Africa as a settled territory of the Empire, and the inevitable politics of confrontation that emerged from the unequal distribution of resources and power. It covers the emergence and growth of Mau Mau, and the strategies applied by the British to confront and nullify what was in reality a tactically inexpert, but nonetheless powerfully symbolic black expression of political violence. That Mau Mau set the tone for Kenyan independence somewhat blurred the clean line of victory and defeat. The revolt was suppressed and peace restored, but events in the colony were nevertheless swept along by the greater movement of Africa toward independences, resulting in the eventual establishment of majority rule in Kenya in 1964. Peter Baxter is an author, amateur historian and African field, mountain and heritage travel guide. Born in Kenya and educated in Zimbabwe, he has lived and travelled over much of southern and central Africa. He has guided in all the major mountain ranges south of the equator, helping develop the concept of sustainable travel, and the touring of battlefield and heritage sites in East Africa. Peter lives in Oregon, USA, working on the marketing of African heritage travel as well as a variety of book projects. His interests include British Imperial history in Africa and the East Africa campaign of the First World War in particular. His first book was Rhodesia: Last Outpost of the British Empire, he has written several books in the Africa@War series, including France in Centrafrique, Selous Scouts, Mau Mau and SAAF's Border War.

In 1961, Portugal found itself fighting a war to retain its colonial possessions and preserve the remnants of its empire. It was almost completely unprepared to do so, and this was particularly evident in its ability to project power and to control the vast colonial spaces in Africa. Following the uprisings of March of 1961 in the north of Angola, Portugal poured troops into the colony as fast as its creaking logistic system would allow; however, these new arrivals were not competent and did not possess the skills needed to fight a counterinsurgency. While counterinsurgency by its nature requires substantial numbers of light infantry, the force must be trained in the craft of fighting a 'small war' to be effective. The majority of the arriving troops had no such indoctrination and had been readied at an accelerated pace. Even their uniforms were hastily crafted and not ideally suited to fighting in the bush. In reoccupying the north and addressing the enemy threat, Portugal quickly realized that its most effective forces were those with special qualifications and advanced training. Unfortunately, there were only very small numbers of such elite forces. The maturing experiences of Portuguese and their consequent adjustments to fight a counterinsurgency led to development of specialized, tailored units to close the gaps in skills and knowledge between the insurgents and their forces. The most remarkable such force was the flechas, indigenous Bushmen who lived in eastern Angola with the capacity to live and fight in its difficult terrain aptly named 'Lands at the End of the Earth'. Founded in 1966, they were active until the end of the war in 1974, and were so successful in their methods that the flecha template was copied in the other theaters of Guiné and Mozambique and later in the South African Border War. The flechas were a force unique to the conflicts of southern Africa. A flecha could smell the enemy and his weapons and read the bush in ways that no others could do. He would sleep with one ear to the ground and the other to the atmosphere and would be awakened by an enemy walking a mile away. He could conceal himself in a minimum of cover and find food and water in impossible places. In short, he was vastly superior to the enemy in the environment of eastern Angola, and at the height of the campaign there (1966–1974) this small force accounted for 60 per cent of all enemy kills. This book is the story of how they came to be formed and organized, their initial teething difficulties, and their unqualified successes.

While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the first decade of confrontations between Libya and several of its neighbors, but foremost the USA and France, between 1973 and 1985, the second is to cover the period of less than a year – between mid-1985 and March 1986, when this confrontation reached its first climax. Through mid and late 1985, relations between France and Libya became tense over the situation in Chad. By early 1986, the French felt forced to deploy their air force for an airstrike on the crucial Libyan air base at Wadi Doum, in the north of that country. Tripoli reacted with a high-profile aerial attack on N'Djamena IAP and by bolstering support for its proxies. This eventually provoked Paris to launch its third military intervention in that country, Operation Épervier. Meanwhile, a series of terror attacks on US citizens and interests in Europe and the Mediterranean area took place. While most of these saw the involvement of Iran and Syria too, Libya was recognized as major supporter of the activities in question. In the aftermath of several traumatic experiences, the US administration began planning for direct action against the government in Tripoli and various terrorist organizations supported by it. As the Pentagon planners prepared a contingency list of targets in Libya, and the US Air Force began planning its involvement, ships and aircraft of the US Navy launched intensive operations off the Libyan coast with the aim of provoking an incident that could be used as a reason for major military attack on Libya. Eventually, these operations culminated in Operation Prairie Fire – a series of short but sharp clashes between the US Navy and Libyan air defenses and the Navy, in March 1986. Part 2 of this mini-series provides an unprecedentedly detailed and richly illustrated description of the involved air forces, their equipment and markings, and related military aerial operations, many of which have remained unknown until today, while others have been forgotten outright.

On 1 October 1990, hundreds of Banyarawanda militants that served with the Ugandan Army deserted their posts to form the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and invade Rwanda. Thus began the Rwandan Civil War, which was to culminate in the famous genocide of nearly one million of Tutsi and moderate Hutus, in 1994. Starting with in-depth descriptions of the history of Rwandan political, military and security development, this volume traces the history of the RPA from its emergence as a small-scale insurgent group formed from the ranks of Rwandan refugee diaspora in Uganda; its military operations and related experiences during nearly four years of war against the Rwandan government; and its establishment of control over Kigali, in July 1994. As such, the narrative presented here provides a fascinating and unique insight into the military story behind the emergence of modern-day Rwanda and its military; considered by many to be the 'Israel of Africa'. Providing minute details about RPF's tactics and doctrine – that strongly influenced developments in a number of other modern-day African wars – this volume is foremost an offering that provides highly interesting backgrounds for and a prequel to, nearly all of the subsequent wars in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo. Illustrated with over 150 photographs, color profiles, and maps describing the equipment, colors, and markings, and tactics of the RPF and its opponents, this is a unique study about the emergence of one of the most important US allies on the African continent.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, has remained a military powerhouse of that continent until the present day. Currently involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts during the last 60 years. One of the most significant was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of the biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of combatants involved. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from 'classic' counter-insurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, utilizing complex plans based on homegrown doctrine. Airpower played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown to the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. Reaching back to extensive studies of Ethiopian and Eritrean military history, this volume provides a detailed account of the first 25 years of this conflict: from the outbreak of armed insurgency in 1961 until the crucial battle of Afabet, in 1988. It is illustrated by over 100 contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

Ethiopia, a country of ancient origins in eastern Africa, remains a military powerhouse of that continent until our days. Nowadays involved in the war in neighboring Somalia, Ethiopia was also involved in half a dozen of other armed conflicts over the last 60 years. Crucial between these was the Eritrean War of Independence. Fought 1961-1991, this was one of biggest armed conflicts on the African continent, especially if measured by numbers of involved combatants. It included a wide spectrum of operations, from 'classic' counterinsurgency (COIN) to conventional warfare in mountains – with the latter being one of the most complex and most demanding undertakings possible to conduct by a military force. Campaigns run during the Eritrean War of Independence often included large formations of relatively well-equipped forces, led by well-trained commanders, along well-thought-out plans, based on homegrown doctrine. The air power played a crucial – although not necessarily decisive – role in many of battles. Nevertheless, most of details about this conflict remain unknown in the wider public. Similarly, relatively few Western observers are aware of relations between the Eritrean liberation movements, and various dissident and insurgent movements inside Ethiopia – although the synergy of these eventually led the downfall of the so-called Derg government, in 1991. While the first volume in this mini-series spanned the history of wars between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1961 and 1988, the second covers the period since. Correspondingly, it is providing coverage of military operations that led to the fall of the Derg government in Ethiopia of 1991, the period of Eritrean military buildup and a complete reorganization of the Ethiopian military in the 1990s, and concludes with the first detailed account of the so-called Badme War, fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea in period 1998-2001. It is illustrated by many contemporary photographs, maps and color profiles.

As of 1975, the decade's long insurgency in Angola appeared to be short of its conclusion. However, with no less than three major insurgent movements fighting for supremacy, the war went on and then South Africa, USA, the Soviet Union, Zaire and Cuba became involved. Affairs like the CIA's efforts to destabilize Angola for little else but to recoup its prestige after the catastrophic defeat in South Vietnam, or the South African military intervention in Angola – Operation Savannah – have attracted lots of public attention and are relatively well covered in related publications. On the contrary, the final stages of the Portuguese withdrawal, the military buildup of three native insurgent forces, and then the onset of the Cuban military intervention in Angola – Operation Carlotta run in 1975 and 1976 – remain largely unknown. Based on extensive research with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, the War of Intervention in Angola is providing a unique insight precisely into the latter topic. It traces the failures of the US-supported FNLA, the growth and reorganization of the MPLA into a conventional army; deployment of Cuban military contingents, their capabilities and intentions; and the performance and experiences of the MPLA and Cuban forces at war with South Africans and the third Angolan insurgent group – UNITA. The volume is illustrated with over 100 rare photographs, a dozen of maps and 15 color profiles.

Confrontations between Libya, and the USA and France reached their highest point in the period between April 1986 and early 1989. In response to a Libyan-instigated and supported series of terror attacks against US citizens and interests in Europe, in April 1986 the USA launched Operation El Dorado Canoyon – a series of raids against carefully selected targets in Libya. Simultaneously, the USA and France bolstered the military of the Chadian government, enabling it to subsequently launch an all-out advance against Libyan troops and proxy forces in the north of Libya. This culminated in the series of spectacular campaigns better known as 'Toyota Wars', characterized by high speed of operations and surprise. The Chadian Army defeated its opponents in 1987 and nearly launched an invasion of Libya in 1988, successfully concluding this conflict. This title closes the Libyan Air Wars mini-series with a detailed insight into the final US–Libyan confrontation, which took place in early 1989, and culminated in another high-profile air combat between the most modern jet fighters of the Libyan Arab Air Force, and the US Navy. As usual, the volume is richly illustrated by well over 150 contemporary and exclusive photographs, color profiles, and maps, detailing the history, training, equipment, markings and tactics of the involved air forces.

In 1971, Idi Amin Dada, a former officer of the King's African Rifles and commander of the Ugandan Army, seized power in a military coup in Uganda. Characterized by human rights abuses, political repression, ethnic persecution, extra judicial killings, nepotism, corruption and gross economic mismanagement, Amin's rule drove thousands into exile. Amin shifted the country's orientation in international relations from alliances with the West and Israel, to cooperation with the Soviet Union. With Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere offering sanctuary to Uganda's ousted president, Milton Obote, Ugandan relations with Tanzania soon became strained too. Already in 1972, a group of Tanzania-based exiles attempted, unsuccessfully, to invade Uganda and remove Amin. By late 1978, following another attempted coup against him, Amin deployed his troops against the mutineers, some of whom fled across the Tanzanian border. The rebellion against him thus spilled over into Tanzania, against whom Uganda then declared a state of war. Opening with an overview of the ascent of crucial military and political figures, and the buildup of the Tanzanian and Ugandan militaries during the 1960s and 1970s, this volume provides an in-depth study of the related political and military events, but foremost of military operations during the Kagera War – also known as 'A Just War' – fought between Tanzania and Uganda in 1978–1979. It further traces the almost continuous armed conflict in Uganda of 1981–1994, which became renowned for emergence of several insurgent movements notorious for incredible violence against civilian population, some of which remain active in central Africa to this day. This book is illustrated with an extensive selection of photographs, color profiles, and maps, describing the equipment, markings, and tactics of the involved military forces.

Portuguese paratroopers or "paras" began as a stepchild of the army and found a home in the Portuguese Air Force in 1955. Initially, the post-World War Two Portuguese Army seemed to have had mixed emotions about the need for elite, special-purpose forces that operated in small units with the attendant flexibility and elevated lethality. Shock troops have been traditionally controversial, and even the vaunted military theorist Baron Karl von Clausewitz saw little point in them. The history of the paras in the Portuguese Army is illustrative of this ambivalent view. Nevertheless, in a "war of the weak" in which insurgents avoid government strengths and exploit its vulnerabilities using agility, deception, and imagination, such small, crack government units are particularly well suited to counterinsurgency operations. This appreciation emerged with the threat of a new kind of war in Portuguese Africa, an insurgency, and the new and visionary Air Force well understood the potential of paras when combined with the mobility of the helicopter. The Air Force saw an urgent need for troops who could fight an unconventional war, who could not only defeat an enemy but separate him from the population in which he sought concealment and support and on which he depended for funding, recruits, and intelligence. These were specialised warfighters who in one minute were physically destroying an insidious enemy and in the next administering aid and support and protecting a vulnerable population. These were just the troops that Portugal would require for military success in its approaching battle fought between 1961 and 1974 to retain its African possessions, and this vision would be realized on the African battlefield with devastating consequences. This book tells the paras' story as researched from Portuguese sources. It details how they were formed and trained and how they developed their imaginative, effective, and feared tactics and applied them in operations to protect the population from insurgent predations and destroy a vicious enemy.

Between 1961 and 1974 Portugal fought a war to retain its African colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Collectively known as the Campaigns for Africa, the origin of the conflict stems from the post-World War II atmosphere of nationalism and anti-colonial fervor. The Angolan insurgency began in 1961, followed by unrest in Guinea-Bissau in 1963 and Mozambique in 1964. Portugal's initial actions in Angola were based on foot-slogging by infantry, considered the best method of addressing an insurgency, not only to hunt the enemy but also to keep contact with the population. But in the vast areas of Angola – the majority of which was unsuited to wheeled vehicles – this tactical approach was too painful, and for Portugal the number of troops available was limited. The helicopter was a possible solution, but it was beyond Portugal's finance resources and it had a tendency to fly over those areas where it was vital to communicate with the population and secure its loyalty. When in 1966 the enemy guerrillas sought a new front in eastern Angola, Portugal needed a force that could combine mobility over rough terrain with the ability to engage insurgents, while maintaining strong links with the population. One of the adaptive solutions to this challenge was found in the past: create horse cavalry units in the form of dragoons that were equally trained for cavalry or infantry service, just as their historical predecessors fought. In this particular case, adaptive tactics involved adjusting existing military methods and means from the traditional and available inventory to craft a solution that would deny eastern Angola to insurgents and support the population there. This story is about imaginative thinking that, instead of a 'forced abandonment of the old', led to a 'resurrection of the old.'

“France in Centrafrique” explores the pre-and post-colonial history of the Republic of Central Africa as well as giving the reader a taste of the country's involvement in WWII itself. The main focus of this volume is on Central Africa's independence and the rise to power of Jean Bedel Bokassa including the Focard network and Françafrique connections, France's military links with RCA (defense agreements), the republic's post-independence military, its politics and Bokassa's coup. It takes a staggering look at Central Africa under Bokassa's leadership and the ensuing break down in its relationship with France. Operation Baracuda was the natural culmination of that soured relationship and in this book de Cherisey examines "France's last colonial expedition", the planning of the operation, its players, a step-by-step breakdown and its outcome. To bring the reader up to speed with the RCA de Cherisey discusses the years after Bokassa, a new political rule, the effects on the army and the relationship with France all the way to Operation Almandin I, II and III. France's involvement in the RCA is deep-seated and ongoing. This book concludes with a look at Operation Boali, Bozizé's coup and the international fallout in terms of further intervention both from France and the EUFOR.

During the 13-year insurgency (1961–74) in Portuguese Africa, more than 800,000 men and women served in the Portuguese armed forces. Of this number, about 9,000 served as commandos (or about 1 percent). Yet their combat losses ― 357 dead, 28 missing in action and 771 wounded ― represented 11.5 percent of the total casualties (a percentage 10 times that of normal troops). It is well established that these warriors were responsible for the elimination of more insurgents and capturing more of their weapons than any other force during the war. Great pains were taken to stay abreast of the latest enemy operational methods and maintain the 'warrior edge' in the force. This edge, in essence, was an approach to fighting that pushed the commandos always to think of themselves as the hunter rather than the hunted. Officers returning from contact with the enemy were rigorously debriefed, and commando instructors regularly participated in operations to learn of the latest enemy developments. This information was integrated with intelligence from other sources gathered by the military and national intelligence services, and from this current knowledge, training was constantly revised to remain attuned to the enemy and his behavior. The commandos became a breed apart - and their reputation was such that when insurgents discovered a unit deployed into their area, they would generally withdraw until the killers left. This commando training - and its sympathy with the fighting environment - made the commandos the most effective ground force in the Portuguese Army. The commandos were expert practitioners in the art of counterinsurgency, and their practice of destroying the enemy in great numbers quickly and quietly served as inspiration not only to South Africa and Rhodesia, but to the enemy himself. This is the story of the Portuguese commandos: their beginnings, their unique operations and their legacy and influence in subsequent sister units such as the Buffalo Battalion of South Africa.

In the early hours of 22 November 1970, six Portuguese warships surrounded Conakry, the capital of the Republic of Guinea, on the West African coast. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, a military force landed on the northern and southern coasts of the sleeping city. At the head of these men was a young Portuguese marine officer, Commander Alpoim Calvão, who had been appointed to command this secret operation, codenamed Green Sea - Mar Verde in Portuguese. The main objective of the invasion was to promote a coup d'état in the former French colony and overthrow the regime of President Sékou Touré, who supported the guerrillas of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), who were fighting for the independence of Portuguese Guinea. The invaders also sought to destroy the naval resources that the guerrillas and the Guinean navy had in the port of Conakry, capture the leader of the party, Amilcar Cabral, and rescue a group of Portuguese soldiers held in a PAIGC prison. The incursion would not have the expected success concerning the coup d'état, and Portugal would be condemned by international organizations for the invasion of a sovereign state, but this operation would remain in the memory of many as the most daring carried out during the colonial war in Africa, although the Portuguese regime never recognized its involvement.

Through late 1987 and early 1988, the battlefields of southern Angola moved ever further away from the border with South West Africa/Namibia, until the showdown between the Soviet and Cuban-supported government in Luanda and South African-supported insurgency of UNITA culminated in the controversial and still much disputed Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. During this period, Angolan and Cuban airpower slowly grew to a point where it outmatched the SAAF, in turn limiting the freedom of movement of the SADF and UNITA ground forces, and reducing their operations to attritional battles, with little chance of achieving major victories on terms acceptable to the government in Pretoria. As the changing political climate between East and West, and in Africa began to bring about and end to the South African intervention in Angola and the occupation of South West Africa/Namibia, the government of Angola was able to switch its attentions to dealing with UNITA. Volume 5 of War of Intervention in Angola examines in detail this final period of Cuban involvement in the long and tragic civil war that ruined Angola between 1975 and 1992. While the emphasis is upon the operations of the Angolan and Cuban air forces, it also details how these impacted upon the ground operations of all parties. This volume is richly illustrated with original photographs of the forces involved, specially commissioned maps of the ground operations, and a range of full color artworks.​

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 3 covers the air warfare during the II Angolan War – fought 1975-1992 – through narrating the emergence and operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defence Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources. Most accounts of this conflict – better known in the West as the 'Border War' or the 'Bush War', as named by its South African participants – tend to find the operations by the FAPA/DAA barely worth mentioning. A handful of published histories mention two of its MiG-21s claimed as shot down by Dassault Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1981 and 1982, and at least something about the activities of its MiG-23 interceptors during the battles of the 1987-1988 period. On the contrary, the story told by Angolan and Cuban sources not only reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola of the 1980s: indeed, it reveals to what degree this conflict was dictated by the availability – or the lack of – air power and shows that precisely this issue dictated the way that the commanders of the Cuban contingents deployed to the country – whether as advisors or as combat troops – planned and conducted their operations. It is thus little surprising that the first contingent of Cuban troops deployed to Angola during Operation Carlota, in late 1975, included a sizeable group of pilots and ground personnel who subsequently helped build-up the FAPA/DAA from virtually nothing. They continued that work over the following 14 years - sometimes in cooperation of Soviet advisors and others from East European countries – eventually establishing an air force that by 1988 maintained what South African military intelligence and the media subsequently described as the 'most advanced air defense system in Africa'. Not only the air defense system in question, but also the aircraft serving as its extended arms, ultimately managed a unique feat in contemporary military history: they enabled an air force equipped with Soviet-made aircraft and trained along the Soviet doctrine to establish at least a semblance of aerial superiority over an air force equipped with Western-made aircraft and operating under a Western doctrine. Based on extensive research with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, the War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 3 traces the military build-up of the FAPA/DAA in the period 1975-1992, its capabilities and its intentions. Moreover, it provides a unique, blow-by-blow account of its combat operations and experiences. The volume is illustrated with 100 rare photographs, half a dozen maps and 15 color profiles, thus providing a unique source of reference on this topic.

War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4 continues the coverage of the operational history of the Angolan Air Force and Air Defense Force (FAPA/DAA) as told by Angolan and Cuban sources, in the period 1985-1988. Many accounts of this conflict – better known in the West as the 'Border War' or the 'Bush War', as named by its South African participants – consider the operations of the FAPA/DAA barely worth commentary. At most, they mention a few air combats involving Mirage F.1 interceptors of the South African Air Force (SAAF) in 1987 and 1988, and perhaps a little about the activity of the FAPA/DAA's MiG-23s. However, a closer study of Angolan and Cuban sources reveals an entirely different image of the air war over Angola in the 1980s: indeed, it reveals the extent to which the flow of the entire war was dictated by the availability – or the lack – of air power. These issues strongly influenced the planning and conduct of operations by the commanders of the Angolan and Cuban forces. Based on extensive research with the help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 4 traces the Angolan and Cuban application of air power between 1985-1988 – during which it came of age – and the capabilities, intentions, and the combat operations of the air forces. The volume is illustrated with 100 rarely seen photographs, half a dozen maps and 15 color profiles, and provides a unique source of reference on this subject.

As of mid-1976, the civil war in Angola was seemingly decided: supported by a large contingent of Cuban forces, the MPLA established itself in power in Luanda. Its native competitors, the US-French-Zaire-supported FNLA, and UNITA, supported by China and South Africa, were in tatters. The French and Zaire-supported FLEC – an armed movement for the independence of the oil-rich Cabinda enclave – was in disarray. The last few of their surviving units were either driven out of the country, or forced into hiding in isolated corners of northern and southeastern Angola. Nevertheless, the war went on. The MPLA's government failed to decisively defeat UNITA, in southern Angola, and then found itself facing a coup attempt from within in May 1977. Crushed in blood, this resulted in thousands being jailed and tortured: many more escaped abroad, where they reinforced the ranks of the battered opposition. The coup prompted the Soviets to attempt increasing their influence with the aim of establishing permanent military bases in the country. While all such overtures were turned down, Angolan operations along the border to what was then the South-West Africa (subsequently Namibia) in October 1980, combined with the increased activity of SWAPO – an insurgency against the South African control of that territory - subsequently Namibia – prompted South Africa to launch another military intervention and resume supporting UNITA. In turn, this prompted not only the Cubans to further increase their military presence, but also the Soviet Union into delivering massive amounts of military aid to the government in Luanda. Angola not only assumed the role of one of the major hot battlefields in the Cold War: its 'civil war' saw a number of major showdowns between diverse belligerents, culminating in the Battle of Cangamba in 1983. Based on extensive research, with help of Angolan and Cuban sources, War of Intervention in Angola, Volume 2 traces the military build-up of the Cuban and Soviet-supported Angolan military, the FAPLA and its combat operations, and those of the Cuban military in Angola, in the period 1976-1983, their capabilities and intentions, and their battlefield performances. The volume is illustrated with over 100 rare photographs, half a dozen maps and 18 color profiles.