EBOOK
About
The new edition of a widely used introduction to game theory and its applications, with a focus on economics, business, and politics.
This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science.
The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.
Preface
Part One Introductions
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications
Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory
Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice
Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies
Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability
Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly
Chapter 7 Voting and Elections
Chapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem
Chapter 9 Mixed Strategies
Chapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law
Chapter 11 Zero-Sum Games
Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications
Chapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction
Chapter 13 An Application: Research and Development
Chapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Chapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games
Chapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games
Chapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market
Chapter 18 An Application OPEC
Chapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending
Chapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements
Chapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming
Chapter 22 Strategic Bargaining
Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications
Chapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory
Chapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information
Chapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer
Chapter 26 An Application: Auctions
Chapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty
Chapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem
Chapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation
Part Five Cooperative Games and Matching
Chapter 30 Cooperative Games
Chapter 31 Matching Problems
Part Six Foundations
Chapter 32 Calculus and Optimization
Chapter 33 Probability and Expectation
Chapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility
Chapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria
Index
This widely used introduction to game theory is rigorous but accessible, unique in its balance between the theoretical and the practical, with examples and applications following almost every theory-driven chapter. In recent years, game theory has become an important methodological tool for all fields of social sciences, biology and computer science. This second edition of Strategies and Games not only takes into account new game theoretical concepts and applications such as bargaining and matching, it also provides an array of chapters on game theory applied to the political arena. New examples, case studies, and applications relevant to a wide range of behavioral disciplines are now included. The authors map out alternate pathways through the book for instructors in economics, business, and political science.
The book contains four parts: strategic form games, extensive form games, asymmetric information games, cooperative games and matching. Theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, Condorcet paradox, backward induction, subgame perfection, repeated and dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, signaling, the Shapley value, and stable matchings. Applications and case studies include OPEC, voting, poison pills, Treasury auctions, trade agreements, pork-barrel spending, climate change, bargaining and audience costs, markets for lemons, and school choice. Each chapter includes concept checks and tallies end-of-chapter problems. An appendix offers a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, which underpins game theory.
Preface
Part One Introductions
Chapter 1 A First Look at the Applications
Chapter 2 A First Look at the Theory
Part Two Strategic Form Games: Theory and Practice
Chapter 3 Strategic Form Games and Dominant Strategies
Chapter 4 Dominance Solvability
Chapter 5 Nash Equilibrium
Chapter 6 An Application: Cournot Duopoly
Chapter 7 Voting and Elections
Chapter 8 An Application: The Commons Problem
Chapter 9 Mixed Strategies
Chapter 10 Two Applications: Natural Monopoly and Bankruptcy Law
Chapter 11 Zero-Sum Games
Part Three Extensive Form Games: Theory and Applications
Chapter 12 Extensive Form Games and Backward Induction
Chapter 13 An Application: Research and Development
Chapter 14 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Chapter 15 Fintely Repeated Games
Chapter 16 Infinitely Repeated Games
Chapter 17 An Application: Competition and Collusion in the NASDAQ Stock Market
Chapter 18 An Application OPEC
Chapter 19 An Application: Logrolling and Pork-Barrel Spending
Chapter 20 An Application: Trade Agreements
Chapter 21 Dynamic Games with an Application to Global Warming
Chapter 22 Strategic Bargaining
Part Four Asymmetric Information Games: Theory and Applications
Chapter 23 Moral Hazard and Incentives Theory
Chapter 24 Games with Incomplete Information
Chapter 25 Mechanism Design, The Revelation Principle, and Sales to an Unknown Buyer
Chapter 26 An Application: Auctions
Chapter 27 An Application: Price Competition with Cost Uncertainty
Chapter 28 Signaling Games and the Lemons Problem
Chapter 29 An Application: Crisis Bargaining and Escalation
Part Five Cooperative Games and Matching
Chapter 30 Cooperative Games
Chapter 31 Matching Problems
Part Six Foundations
Chapter 32 Calculus and Optimization
Chapter 33 Probability and Expectation
Chapter 34 Utility and Expected Utility
Chapter 35 Existence of Nash Equilbria
Index
Related Subjects
Extended Details
- SeriesStrategies and Games