EBOOK
Learning to Forget
US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq
David Fitzgerald4
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About
Learning to Forget analyzes the evolution of US counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine over the last five decades. Beginning with an extensive section on the lessons of Vietnam, it traces the decline of COIN in the 1970s, then the rebirth of low intensity conflict through the Reagan years, in the conflict in Bosnia, and finally in the campaigns of Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately it closes the loop by explaining how, by confronting the lessons of Vietnam, the US Army found a way out of those most recent wars. In the process, it provides an illustration of how military leaders make use of history and demonstrates the difficulties of drawing lessons from the past that can usefully be applied to contemporary circumstances.
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Reviews
"An excellent study that takes a hard look at America's longest and possibly darkest military shadow."
US Army War College
"This is another welcome addition to the spate of recent literature on counterinsurgency . . . The book's strong suit is Fitzgerald's use of many primary documents, particularly the many studies written during the war analyzing US efforts in Indochina . . . [T]his is a fine contribution to the literature on both counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War . . . Recommended."
CHOICE
"Among the many notable works on the legacy of Vietnam, the decline and resurgence of counterinsurgency doctrine, and the conduct of the Iraq-Afghanistan wars, Fitzgerald's is exemplary. It is a masterful work of research, of synthesis and original analysis, and of clear and insightful writing."
Brian McAllister Linn, Texas A&M University; author of The Philippine War, 1899–1902